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LUMPY PROPERTY
Lee Anne Fennell*
A bridge that only spans three-quarters of the distance across a chasm is
useless, although far from costless. This standard, intuitive example of a
lumpy, indivisible, or step good makes regular appearances in the literature
on collective action.1 But it also illustrates a point about discontinuities and
complementarities that has broad, and mostly unexplored, significance for
property law.2 From land assemblies to takings doctrines to cotenant
partitions to public housing to the numerus clausus principle, we see
property delivering value—and being delivered to us—in certain
identifiable, discontinuous chunks. This essay examines the implications of
lumpiness for property theory and doctrine. Strains of this conceptual
element run through some existing work on property,3 but the ways in
which it may explain, justify, and challenge features of property law have
not been systematically explored.
Viewing property through the lens of lumpiness matters for at least three
reasons. The first is descriptive accuracy. Property law is lumpy as a
positive matter, filled with doctrines and approaches that deal with the
world in discrete, hard-to-divide chunks. It is not possible to understand
how property operates without appreciating its lumpiness. The second
reason lumpiness matters relates to questions of optimal property design. In
evaluating the chunkiness that is built into property doctrines, we must ask
whether and how it corresponds to underlying discontinuities in the
production or consumption of property. A third reason for attending to
*
Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Ariel Porat and participants in the
University of Pennsylvania Law School’s New Dimensions in Property Theory Symposium for helpful comments
and questions, and Aaron Benson and Eric Singer for excellent research assistance on this essay and related
projects.
1
See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (discussing this example and noting some
qualifications).
2
This essay focuses exclusively on real and personal property, and thus does not engage the interesting
complementarities and discontinuities that arise in intellectual property, nor the scholarship surrounding them.
Lumpiness also holds relevance for many other areas of law besides property. For a brief overview, see Lee Anne
Fennell, Slices and Lumps, U Chicago Law & Econ, Olin Working Paper No. 395 (2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106421.
3
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083,
passim (2009) (discussing lumpiness in property entitlements associated with the exclusion strategy); Henry E.
Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 76 (2005) (suggesting efforts to control
delineation costs lead property to be lumpy in nature); Thomas A. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1862 (2007) (arguing that property’s lumpiness introduces an
asymmetry between owners and nonowners). Lumpiness also relates closely to the literature on assembly
problems and economies of scale, some of the theoretical implications of which have been explored in the
literature on the anticommons. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets,111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). For an extensive treatment of the relevance of
scale for real property, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
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lumpiness is that many of property law’s most important conflicts can be
usefully framed as “lump versus lump.” For example, an exercise of
eminent domain may achieve a valuable spatial aggregation by splitting up
some other aggregation, such as lengthy temporal attachments to the land,
or a cohesive community that shares social capital.4 Recognizing the work
that nonlinearities do in such stories can offer new traction on contemporary
property debates.
The analysis here proceeds in four parts. Part I explains how and why
we might regard property as lumpy. Part II examines how ideas connected
to lumpiness enter into property law, whether as rationales for legal
intervention, justifications for doctrinal protections, or bases for judicial or
administrative outcomes. Part III turns to property theory. Here, I show
how notions of lumpiness map onto current debates over the “bundle of
rights” metaphor and over the relationship between exclusion and social
obligation. This discussion also raises questions about the mutability and
social contingency of property’s lumpy nature. Part IV offers some analytic
lessons that property scholars can take away from a study of lumpiness.
I. HOW AND WHY IS PROPERTY LUMPY?
Property entitlements that encompass strongly complementary elements
may be said to have a lumpy or indivisible quality. To take a simple
example, the four walls of a dwelling and its roof and foundation are
generally viewed as strongly complementary. Removing any one element
changes a fully-contained private shelter into a windbreak, cubicle, or leanto. Depending on climate and social context, the last wall will often deliver
a disproportionate amount of utility, just as the last segment of a bridge
does. Similar, if more controversial, claims might implicitly underpin
minimum standards for the quality and size of housing, minimum tenure
lengths, minimum bundles of exclusion, use, and transfer rights, the use of
eminent domain to assemble land into larger chunks, and many other legal
doctrines and interventions. Before exploring these and other applications,
it is necessary to work lay some definitional and taxonomic groundwork.

4
The effects of eminent domain on communities has received scholarly attention. See, e.g., Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 135-42 (2004) (creating a taxonomy of takings that recognizes different impacts on
communities and that would adjust compensation accordingly); Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create,
Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43, 73-74 (2009) (citing Parchomovsky & Siegelman,
supra, and observing that eminent domain doctrine might be modified to “mak[e] governments realize that the
property whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, even in allegedly informal community settings”).
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What’s Lumpy?
As Michael Taylor and Hugh Ward observe, some goods “cannot be
usefully provided in any amounts but only in more or less massive
‘lumps.’”5 A good is lumpy (in one sense) if it provides benefits only when
a particular quantity threshold is reached, rather than delivering utility in
smoothly scalable units as quantities increase.6 More broadly, the notion of
lumpiness is associated with various kinds of discontinuities,
indivisibilities, nonlinearities, and complementarities.
1.

Steps and Lumps

Lumpiness is a matter of degree. At the extreme, a good might take a
“step” form, like the prototypical bridge shown in Figure 1—it is worthless
until all the segments required to span the gap are in place, and gains no
more value thereafter as more segments are added.7

Figure 1: The Bridge
Value

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No. of Segments Assembled

5
Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods
Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982).
6
See, e.g., id.; Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & PHIL.
245, 248-50 (1987). My discussion of “lumpy goods” here is not limited to physical goods; services, conditions,
and other intangibles also can exhibit lumpiness. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1011-19 (1992) (discussing how lumpiness may impact agent effort). Another sort of
lumpiness stems from production limitations rather than consumption utility, as where a product can only
economically be supplied in a particular size or quantity. See infra Part I.A.2.
7
See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 6, at 248-49.
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Such pure step goods are rare.8 But equally rare are goods with a smooth,
continuous production function in which each infinitesimally fine unit of
input is matched by a similarly fine adjustment in output or utility. In
between the smoothly continuous production function and the single large
step we find different degrees of nonlinearity or indivisibility. 9
I will use the term lumpiness here to refer in a general way to severe
discontinuities or nonlinearities in the production function, whether or not
those functions take a pure step form or intersperse sharply increasing or
decreasing returns with ranges exhibiting linearity.10 These differences in
shape are important, however, because they can influence the prospects for
cooperation and the risks of strategic behavior.11 Figure 2 shows another
example of a (relatively) lumpy good.

Figure 2: The S Curve
Value

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No. of Pieces Assembled

8
Even the usual example of a step good, a bridge, does not really qualify; as Russell Hardin has pointed out,
bridges exist at a wide variety of price and quality levels. See HARDIN, supra note 1, at 59.
9
See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 6 at 249-50 (discussing “steppy” and “mixed” goods).
10
Usages vary. Compare id. at 248 (equating “lumpy goods” with “pure step goods” and distinguishing
both from hybrid forms like multi-step and mixed goods) with MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 57-58
(1989) (recognizing the possibility of “lumpy goods with sloping risers” that exhibit linearity “after the initial
production threshold is reached”).
11
See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the
Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522 (1985) (examining the relationship between production
function shapes and the prospects for collective action); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 907, 971-78 (2004) (exploring this point in the context of land use and resource entitlements).
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Although the good depicted in Figure 2 does not deliver all its value in a
single shot, its production function contains ranges over which the marginal
effect of added segments is sharply increasing or decreasing. The S-curve
matches up with many collective goods that require a critical mass of
participation to succeed, but that at some point plateau.12 It might also fit
with certain kinds of land assembly projects, where value increases sharply
once a certain number of parcels are aggregated, but where having all the
parcels is not essential.13 Nonlinearities might take many other forms as
well.
2. What’s In the Lump?
So far I have spoken of “segments” or “pieces” that produce value when
aggregated together. As this formulation suggests, lumpiness or
indivisibility often refers to quantities of relatively fungible inputs—pieces
of a bridge, lengths of railroad track, tires for a car, units of work, years of
housing tenure, and so on. Yet it may also refer to organic systems that have
heterogeneous parts, such as a machine that requires all its parts to run.14 In
the context of land assembly, the unique spatial location of each parcel may
make the component parts nonfungible. Both homogenous and
heterogeneous aggregations fit within the broad conception of lumpiness
pursued here. What matters most to the shape of a given assembly problem
is not whether the components are fungible with each other, but rather
whether good substitutes exist for each of the components that is required
for a given assembly.15
A second point is that the components may be temporal rather than
physical in nature.16 Some goods, such as private residences, are often
viewed as disproportionately valuable when consumed in lengthy,
unbroken, temporal chunks. Sometimes the relevant chunk may be defined
by reference to external events, such as the length of a life, a job, or an
educational program. Property rights intentionally pre-bundle along the

12
See Oliver et al., supra note 11, at 527-28 & fig. 1(a) (presenting and discussing an S-shaped “general
third-order” production function).
13
For graphical representations and analysis of possible land assembly scenarios, see, for example, John F.
McDonald, What Is Public Use? Eminent Domain and the Kelo Decision, 5 CORNELL REAL ESTATE REV. 10
(2007); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957.
14
See ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF TIME AND SPACE 208, 213 (1977).
15
Thus, even though a car may require many different mechanical parts to run (none of which could
substitute for each other), there will be no difficulty assembling the necessary pieces as long as each part is readily
available on the open market. Conversely, even if a group is building a bridge out of identical, interchangeable
segments, there may yet be an assembly problem if there are no outside sources of bridge material and each
individual in the group holds a segment essential to the whole.
16
Components may also take intangible forms such as units of effort, votes, rights, or permissions. See, e.g.,
HARDIN, supra note 1, at 59-61 (discussing an election victory as an example of a step good); Heller, supra note
3, at 635-42 (describing the problem of assembling fragmented property rights in post-Socialist Russia).
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temporal dimension and, at least in the case of the fee simple absolute, do
so in a very open-ended way.
B. Lumpy Demand, Lumpy Supply, and the Law
The fact that goods exhibit lumpiness or indivisibility means not that
they are literally impossible to divide, but that they are considerably less
valuable when divided, or that they are very expensive to divide (or to
produce in smaller units in the first instance).17 As that explanation
suggests, there are two distinct sources of indivisibility: the loss in
consumption utility associated with dividing a lumpy good, and the
production cost associated with pre-divided goods.18 These difficulties track
onto lumpiness in demand, and lumpiness in supply, respectively.
Lumpiness becomes noticeable and relevant when there is a mismatch
between what is demanded and what is supplied.19
Consider first lumpy demand. Lumpiness may be a product of facts
about the world (as presently constituted) that influence the utility people
can derive from certain goods. Most people have two feet of similar size
and follow the social custom of shodding them identically; this makes shoe
purchases occur in lumps of two. Bridges are commonly crossed by
transport units of a certain size and weight that are sensitive to gravity;
these facts, combined with various structural principles, make bridges
lumpy. People and their possessions are vulnerable to weather conditions
and hence do disproportionately better in fully contained shelters than in
ones that are missing a wall or a roof. In these cases and many others, the
indivisibility relates to consumption utility, not to production processes that
compel the provision of goods in particular chunks.20 The lumpiness shows
up in the demand curve, with little or no demand for quantities of the good
below the critical threshold.21
In other instances, lumpiness stems not from consumption utility, but
rather from the costs or technological limits of production. For example,
17
Indivisibility might carry a variety of other meanings. See FADEN, supra note 14, at 213-14 (listing six
possible meanings of indivisibility).
18
Ward and Taylor similarly allude to these twin sources of lumpiness when they define lumpy goods as
those that cannot be “usefully provided” in just any amount—if usefulness and provisioning represent two
separate limitations. See Ward & Taylor, supra note 5, at 353.
19
If production and consumption exhibit closely correlated indivisibilities, lumpiness will be irrelevant. For
example, if the smallest unit of candy that can be economically produced and sold separately is a 1.4 ounce candy
bar, and if most people have no desire to purchase candy in smaller increments than this, whatever theoretical
lumpiness may exist presents no difficulties. Similarly, if dental patients want root canal procedures that are
completed rather than left unfinished, and dentists find it most profitable to offer complete root canal procedures
rather than partial ones, everyone is happy (or as happy as people getting root canals can be).
20
To the extent that bridges and houses require design work that is more cheaply provided in a lump,
however, some indivisibility in production might also be present.
21
See Stephen Shmanske & Daniel Packey, Lumpy Demand and the Diagrammatics of Aggregation, 30 J.
ECON. ED. 64 (1999).
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the fixed costs associated with certain kinds of factory upgrades or
expansions may make them affordably available only in certain-sized
chunks. A firm that wants to expand its facilities or computerize its
operations may find itself facing a choice between overshooting its intended
mark and ending up with excess capacity in space or computing power, or
getting by with inadequate amounts of these goods.22 Lumpiness in supply
can also manifest itself in limited menus of products, where each variety
requires a fixed minimum outlay.23 Consider, for example, Henry Ford’s
decision to offer consumers of his Model T “a car painted any colour that he
wants so long as it is black.”24 Here, the lumpiness is a function of the
indivisible cost of setting up a particular production run, which requires a
critical mass of consumption to support.
Finally, law often introduces indivisibilities. Firms may be required to
offer, and people may constrained to buy, certain bundles and not others. In
the property context, the numerus clausus principle has the effect of
producing a limited, and hence lumpy, menu. Other aspects of property law
keep certain interests from being split up, or require that they be split only
in particular ways. Legally imposed lumps push the inquiry back to the
question of whether there are underlying discontinuities that explain why
certain combinations of entitlements must occur together, or not at all.25
C. Property Lumps
With the idea of lumpiness more clearly in mind, we can consider the
ways in which property might be understood as lumpy. To start, property
might be described as a lumpy institution to the extent that its defining
features are associated with discontinuities or indivisibilities—and, indeed,
to the extent it is even understood as having a set of defining features.26
Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith have recently identified three features
they view as essential to property rights, each of which implicates
lumpiness: in rem rights, the right to exclude, and “running with assets.”27
22

See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment
Used and Useful? 23 ENERGY L.J 383, 385 (2002) (explaining that a utility must add to its capacity in minimum
increments associated with generators or power plants, and observing that “[t]his inability to add capacity in tiny,
tailor-made increments means that new capacity will often give the utility more capacity than it needs for
immediate purposes”).
23
See generally JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT
YOU WANT (2007).
24
HENRY FORD (WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER), MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922); see also WALDFOGEL, supra
note 23, at 119- 20 (attributing Ford’s choice to the costs of customization, as well as the quick-drying properties
of black enamel).
25
It also requires some explanation of why market forces would not already produce the optimal
configuration, absent legal restrictions. See infra Part IV.B.
26
This question bears on the larger theoretical debate about whether a “bundle of sticks” is an appropriate
metaphor for property. See infra Part III.A.
27
Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property 27-31
(working paper dated Aug. 27, 2011).
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In rem rights lump together the world at large in defining duties toward a
property owner, and hence economize on the production of legal
relationships between owners and nonowners.28 Exclusion protects a lumpy
and undifferentiated set of uses by relying on a complete (rather than
broken or partial) conceptual boundary around a resource’s edges.29 Rights
that run with assets, and thus survive transfers of ownership, respond to
property’s temporal lumpiness.30 Some interests in other people’s land are
most valuably consumed in temporal units that may exceed the length of the
relationship between those specific other people and their land.
Doctrines for protecting, regulating, standardizing, adjudicating, and
reconfiguring property entitlements may also be informed by (and limited
by) ideas of lumpiness. I will examine such possibilities in detail in Part II.
For now it is sufficient to note that property law often operates in a lumpy
or lump-sensitive fashion—whether by strongly enforcing exclusion rights,
rendering all-or-nothing judgments, limiting property configurations to
certain clumps of rights, or coercively reaggregating entitlements to form
more valuable wholes. Where legal doctrines rather than markets produce
the operative lumps, interesting questions arise about the presence of
absence of corresponding discontinuities in consumption utility or
production efficiency.
At a larger scale, a system of property rights may itself embody or
produce lumpy public goods. While there may be no single discrete “step”
between a system of property rights that is too insecure to be meaningful
and one which is sufficiently secure to induce widespread reliance and
investment, it is likely that some threshold must be reached before the bulk
of the benefits of the property system can be realized, and that beyond some
very high level of security, additional increments add relatively little to
perceptions of stability.31 Similarly, patterns of lumpy property use and
consumption may produce second-order lumpy goods, like uniformity.
Finally, there is the overarching question of whether the concept of property
is itself lumpy, requiring some minimum set of attributes in order to warrant
the name.32
The balance of the essay explores how these facets of property’s
28

See id. at 28-29; see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (discussing the significance of the distinction between in rem rights associated
with property, and in personam rights associated with contract).
29
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1719 (2004) (providing a
detailed analysis of property’s “exclusion strategy”); see also infra Part II.A.
30
Chang and Smith focus not on temporal lumpiness as such, but instead suggest that this approach follows
from viewing property as “a thing.” Chang & Smith, supra note 27, at 30-31.
31
In other words, the production of property security may follow an S-shaped curve like the one in Figure 2,
if it requires a certain “critical mass” for success. For discussion and modeling of “critical mass” in various social
and collective action contexts, see, for example, THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR
91-110 (1978); Oliver et al., supra note 11.
32
See, e.g., Chang & Smith, supra note 27, at 40 (arguing that a legal relation that lacks one or more of three
enumerated attributes of property is a “quasi-property relation”).
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lumpiness interact with each other and with current debates over how to
conceptualize and operationalize ownership.
II. LUMPY DOCTRINES
A variety of property doctrines deliver up lumpy or lump-sensitive
results, or present people with lumpy choices. The sections below examine
how lumpiness relates to three of property law’s basic moves: enforcing
exclusion, limiting configurations, and dividing and aggregating
entitlements.
A. Enforcing Exclusion
An “exclusion strategy”33 depends on defining resources as things with
closed edges.34 Just as a partial fence is no fence at all (if containment is the
goal) and a partial bridge is no bridge at all (if traversing the span is the
goal), leaving one side of a parcel of land unprotected from intruders
undoes the idea of exclusion. Understanding property holdings as selfcontained capsules with hard exclusionary edges makes property a very
lumpy institution. On Henry Smith’s account of modularity, ownership
hides information about uses, and does so intentionally, in what amounts to
a societal act of delegation.35 This vision of property tracks well onto strong
property rule protection against trespass and physical interference.36 On this
account, breaking open the capsule, even trivially, alters its integrity and
may have any number of unanticipated effects that only the owner can fully
know or appreciate.
This view of property helps to explain why even harmless
encroachments may be addressed injunctively, or, failing that, strongly
deterred with supercompensatory remedies. As Smith has emphasized,
property protection legally constructs a discontinuity at the parcel’s edges
by making the consequences of boundary crossing highly significant.37 That
33

See Smith, supra note 29, passim.
See Chang & Smith, supra note 27, at 4, 29. To say that an exclusion-based property interest requires
complete boundaries does not mean it requires impermeable boundaries, nor does it require that the boundaries do
all the work in protecting the property’s value.
35
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 29, at 1754-55 (discussing property as delegation); Henry E. Smith,
Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L.. 5, 16-18 (2009) (drawing connections between
exclusion strategies and modularity, and noting the way that modules hide information); Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (2006) (explaining
that “[e]xclusion rights implement the ‘information hiding’ or encapsulation that is the hallmark of modularity.”).
36
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (distinguishing property rules from liability rules).
37
Smith, supra note 29, at 1750 (describing discontinuities in sanctions applied at property boundaries); see
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1984) (discussing the discontinuity that is
produced by a sanction, which “typically creates an abrupt jump in an individual's costs when he passes from the
permitted zone into the forbidden zone where behavior is sanctioned”).
34
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legal discontinuity operates on both sides of the border. Not only can trivial
and harmless encroachments be prevented and punished, but very
significant and harmful impacts emanating from outside the property’s
edges may either be entirely nonactionable, or may be redressable only with
damages—a liability rule solution.38
The question that an explicit focus on lumpiness pushes us to ask is
whether the legally constructed discontinuity corresponds to some
underlying discontinuity in how property is produced or consumed, or
whether it is an artifact of an earlier set of social circumstances that we
should be in the process of unwinding. The argument from modularity
suggests an underlying lumpiness in consumption utility: if property’s uses
are very opaque and potentially idiosyncratic, having the whole thing may
be enormously different from having almost the whole thing, and in ways
nonowners could never hope to understand. But this is an empirically
debatable proposition.
Significantly, most land in metropolitan areas today is subject to zoning
and other forms of land use controls that take the mystery out of what the
owner may be doing with her property. Moreover, modern threats to
owners’ holdings come less in the form of intrusions across boundary lines
than effects emanating from beyond the property lines—what neighbors,
merchants, governmental entities, and employers are doing in the
surrounding area.39 It is undoubtedly true that some owners have
construction or other plans for their land that depend on retaining control
over the full spatial and temporal footprint; for them, losing a little could
mean losing a lot. This does not tell us, however, whether consumption
discontinuities support generalizing a hard-edged exclusion strategy across
the run of owners. It is also undoubtedly true that some owners have plans,
like upgrading to a larger home as their family grows, that depend on
retaining home equity that sums to a certain lump of monetary value. Yet
we have not generalized a strategy for protecting owners against all threats
to home equity.
A separate argument for strong exclusion rights turns on economies in
the production of property protection. It may be more economical to
produce protection that tracks parcel edges rather than protection that tracks
dissipation of value, and cheaper to provide full-on injunctive protection
than to provide graduated remedies that take account of the actual loss of
value. In other words, the constructed discontinuity in legal consequences
at the parcel edges may correspond to a discontinuity in the costs of
producing legal protection. Yet again, we must examine the empirics of this
38

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1092.
See generally LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY
LINES (2009).
39
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claim. We would need to know not only the relative costs of different kinds
of property protection, but also the extent to which each type of protection
furthers the goals of property under present social conditions.
B. Limiting Configurations
By law, property is consumed in certain chunks rather than in all
imaginable combinations. These legal restrictions may not, and need not,
always relate to underlying discontinuities. Property law often responds to a
continuous variable, like noise or density or space, by drawing a bright
prohibitory line in some place, even if the things that fall on either side of
the line resemble each other closely.40 Thus, we should not assume that
lumpiness explains (or must be invoked to explain) restrictions that merely
operate as floors or ceilings along dimensions that produce externalities.
But in the realm of property configurations, the law often does more than
set simple minima or maxima in the name of externality (or even
internality41) control. Instead, configurations are often limited for reasons
that appear to circle back to matters of configuration itself. The sections
below examine three examples: housing standards, the numerus clausus
principle, and limits on fragmentation.
1. Housing Standards
Restrictions like housing codes and implied warranties of habitability
mandate that residential property be consumed, if at all, in minimally
habitable chunks. But because this mandate is not accompanied by a
guarantee of habitable housing, households that cannot achieve the level of
the minimum legal rental must instead rely on temporary shelters, sleeping
on sidewalks, and so on. The result is a gap on the spectrum of legal
housing. Very thin housing rights, such as a temporary sleeping space, are
legal. Somewhat thicker ones, like a tar-paper shack, are illegal. The
standard explanations for limits on housing involve controlling externalities
or securing some minimum level of shelter for household members. But if
housing arrangements that fall below a certain level are problematic on
these grounds, it is hard to understand why it would be preferable to have a
40
See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926) (observing that laws that may be in some
respects overinclusive may nonetheless be justified in contexts where “the bad fades into the good by such
insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms of
legislation”). The arguments for and against bright line responses to continuous variables relate to a well-known
and extensive literature on rules versus standards. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985).
41
Internalities are “within-person externalities”—the effects of one’s current choices on one’s future selves
that one does not take into account. R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in
Individual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION-MAKING 149, 150 (1993).
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system that pushes many families to a yet lower point on the housing
hierarchy.42
One set of explanations might relate to lumpiness in consumption
utility. A welfare system that has six needy families and only enough
building materials to construct one full dwelling might rationally decide not
to divide the available building components equally among the families but
rather focus on constructing one full unit. Public housing assistance follows
roughly this approach by relying on queuing for access to housing that
meets particular standards43 rather than on pro rata distribution of housing
dollars among all eligible families.44 Those who are left out of this
distribution may be relegated to homelessness or to crowding in with
extended family or friends—a difficult result to defend. Yet an argument
for deploying housing dollars in discrete lumps could follow from the
(empirically debatable) claim that “incomplete” or substandard housing
bundles add little to well-being up until the point where a certain quality
threshold is reached.45
An additional justification would be necessary to support interventions
into private transactions over housing. One rationale might be based on the
assumption that low-income households experience smaller utility
discontinuities at the line between the almost-habitable and the minimallyhabitable than their neighbors experience in the form of spillovers. Suppose,
for example, that externalities stay the same or decrease only trivially as
conditions improve within the substandard housing range, but drop
dramatically once the minimum level of habitability is achieved. If
externalities will be produced at roughly the same level no matter how far
42
A complication here relates to the spatial distribution of households at various housing levels. Externality
control might indeed be the justification for keeping rental housing above a certain level in areas that where
homeless people will not enter or remain. Yet areas in which homelessness is prevalent also maintain minimum
housing standards for rental dwellings, presenting the puzzle noted in the text.
43
Demand for public housing so far exceeds supply in some areas of the U.S. that families must enter a
lottery to get a space on a lengthy waiting list. See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority, Family Wait List Lottery
FAQs, http://www.thecha.org/pages/family_wait_list_lottery_faqs/76.php (providing information about the 2010
random lottery that added 40,000 families to the wait list for Chicago public housing, and indicating that those
who were successful in the lottery may have to wait five to seven years to be called for screening).
44
David Super uses the term “functional entitlement” to denote public benefits that are provided at some
specified level that is meant to be sufficient to meet a particular need. David A. Super, The Political Economy of
Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (2004). Although he finds functional entitlements to be “relatively rare in
public benefits law,” see id. at 657, housing assistance that requires units to meet certain standards fits the
definition. See id. at 657 n.109.
45
For a related discussion, see CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 67-81, 127-29 (2007).
Karelis suggests that the marginal utility of money may rise within certain ranges because it allows larger and
hence disproportionately more effective doses of relief to be applied. See also Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage,
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 298-99 (1948) (presenting the FriedmanSavage utility curve which hypothesizes that there are intervals in which the marginal utility of money is
increasing); Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904,
929-939 (2011) (discussing the Friedman-Savage curve). Notably, Karelis does not frame his argument in terms
of lumpiness or discontinuities, and indeed disavows any connection between those ideas and his own. See
KARELIS, supra, at 119-22. Nonetheless, the intuitive arguments that he makes are consistent with production
functions that exhibit these features.
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below the level of habitability households go, then externalities would be
minimized by simply minimizing the number of households consuming
substandard housing, without regard to how they are distributed among
substandard housing types. Removing intermediate points between
homelessness and minimally habitable leaseholds heightens the utility cliff
a household will experience if it fails to achieve habitable housing. This
move would create very strong incentives to obtain habitable housing, and
hence would be expected to reduce the number of households in below-code
territory—but not without normatively problematic impacts on those who
are unable to respond to the incentive.
Individuals and households might also wish to enlist the law’s help in
constructing lumpy choices for bargaining purposes. Removing inferior
alternatives from a choice set will have two effects: it will decrease the
likelihood of obtaining the good, but will guarantee a better version of the
good, conditional on obtaining it at all. The power of the chunky option lies
in presenting one’s bargaining partner with an all-or-nothing choice.46 That
removing alternatives can at times improve outcomes by altering the
bargaining environment explains why individuals might support
nonwaivable housing or employment rights—even though this means
placing restrictions on their own choices.47
Some housing restrictions might be aimed at producing network effects
across neighborhoods or communities that parties acting independently
would have difficulty producing. Here, the lumpy good in question would
be a second-order one—the pattern of chunky consumption choices. This
argument has been made, for example, in the context of accessibility
features for people with disabilities: a world in which all properties are
accessible is a very different one to navigate than a world in which
accessibility is hit or miss, and there may well be nonlinearities associated
with reaching certain thresholds of widespread accessibility.48

46

The all-or-nothing nature of the choice will only obtain if all dimensions of the offered good are
constrained. Thus, a landlord who is forced to get a unit up to code or withdraw it from the market entirely does
not really face a lumpy choice in terms of the surplus she must cede to a tenant if she can raise the rent
accordingly; likewise, rent control does not guarantee a tenant a given amount of housing surplus unless it is
accompanied by controls on the conditions of the premises that prevent landlords from withdrawing surplus
through chiseling on maintenance and the provision of amenities. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent
Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 373-74 (1986) (discussing the interaction between rent control and
habitability standards).
47
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 959
n.79 (1985); Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 58–62 (1986).
48
See David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47, 98
(noting the possibility that private architectural choices regarding accessibility could have network effects); Robin
Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2009)
(arguing for “inclusive design standards” for single-family homes). Other aspects of housing law might be
directed at preserving community networks against the threat of dispersion. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 46, at 369
(discussing this rationale for rent control).
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2. The Numerus Clausus Principle
Just as there is a gap on the housing spectrum between minimally
permissible leaseholds and homelessness, there is also a gap between
leaseholds on the one hand, and homeownership that meets certain
standards in terms of financing arrangements and risk-bearing on the other.
The gap leaves out a range of innovative hybrid arrangements that would
blend elements of renting and owning.49 The result is a lumpiness in
property forms that requires households either to make a large jump in riskbearing by becoming owners or to continue renting; households whose ideal
point lies between the two tenure forms have to settle for more or less.50
This seems hard to justify on externality grounds, given that the primary
problems identified with intermediate forms—too much or too little riskbearing—exist in even stronger form with traditional homeownership or
traditional leaseholds.
The gap on the tenure spectrum can be explained doctrinally by the
numerus clausus principle; property law clusters around certain approved
tenure forms and disapproves new customizations and hybrids.51 But we
still must explain the principle itself. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith
offer one rationale: that idiosyncratic tenure forms impose informational
externalities by making it harder for both potential counterparties and
strangers to learn about the relevant rights.52 These claims are open to
question.53 As long as ownership sticks to exclusion as its dominant and
defining strategy, the details of the tenure form should be of no concern to
those hoping to steer clear of a property violation; they simply stay off.54
Nor is the information environment facing would-be transactors materially
simplified by having limited forms, given the innumerable other
49
Such hybrids are not entirely absent, but they are limited in scope and are not well-supported by current
tax and regulatory regimes. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Rectifying the Tax Treatment of Shared Appreciation
Mortgages, 62 TAX L REV 505, 514–29 (2009); Andrew Caplin, et al, Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project
*24-28 (Yale International Center for Finance Working Paper No 03-12, May 2003), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=410141.
50
ANDREW CAPLIN, ET AL, HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS 6
(1997) (“The ‘all or nothing’ constraint on home ownership forces households to make the stark choice between
rental accommodations’ disadvantages and complete ownership’s harsh financial realities.”).
51
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in
Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008).
52
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 31-34. A number of other rationales for the doctrine have also been
posited. See, e.g., Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 3D SERIES 237, 245-63 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987) (considering
and critiquing a variety of explanations); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002)
(suggesting that limited forms help to serve a verification function when rights are divided).
53
For a compelling critique, see Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1484-88 (2004).
54
This observation suggests that some of the elements that have been treated as complementary by property
scholars could actually operate as substitutes. On this account, an exclusion strategy might facilitate relaxation of
the numerus clausus principle.
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nonstandardized features about which they must learn before engaging in a
transaction.55
Having everyone consume just a few recognizable forms of property
might, however, produce other benefits. There may be economies in
producing and comprehending law, for example, if legal restrictions can be
more easily built around identifiable tenure nodes.56 Other network effects,
such as social cohesiveness and trust, might be associated with everyone in
a given neighborhood sharing the same tenure form.57 Yet even if we accept
informational or network externalities as an argument for a limited menu,
we would still want some account of why the particular entries on our
current property menu are at least roughly the correct ones, both in number
and content. We would also want to know whether the scale at which the
limited menu operates tracks the scale at which uniformity produces these
benefits. The reason is one that Merrill and Smith themselves identify:
there are “frustration costs” associated with being unable to pursue desired
customizations.58
3. Limiting Fragmentation to Ease Reconfiguration
The idea that certain property aggregations or disaggregations can
produce disproportionate value runs through much of property law and
theory. As we will see, it is often used to justify coercive reconfigurations.59
But the law might also limit certain configurations in an attempt to improve
or conserve opportunities for future non-coercive reaggregation.60 This
rationale has been invoked as a potential explanation of everything from
minimum lot sizes to the rule against perpetuities.61
The issue of reconfiguration arises when there is a change over time in
the optimal scale of resource use.62 For example, land that was most
valuable when subdivided into townhouse-sized parcels at Time 1 might at
Time 2 be best suited to a large shopping center or an urban park. Such
55

See Robinson, supra note 53, at 1487-88.
See Davidson, supra note 51, at 1655-60 (discussing the numerus clausus doctrine as a “regulatory
platform”).
57
See Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1344 (2011).
58
Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 35-38.
59
See infra Part II.C.
60
See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173–82 (1999); see
also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics,
Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 15–16 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1143 & n.137 (2003).
61
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 60, at 1173, 1179-80.
62
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 48 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011) (discussing the problem of
shifting efficient scale over time); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2008) (observing that “[a]ggregation and disaggregation of parcels in
order to permit each use as it becomes most efficient is not an easy matter”).
56
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changes effectively shift the inflection point at which increasing returns to
scale stop, and diminishing returns set in (or vice versa). Thus, minor
changes in scale may at times dictate a major change in use, with associated
effects on overall social value. Stephen Shmanske and Daniel Packey give
the example of a golf course that requires a minimum of 91 acres to be
viable.63 If only 90 acres can be assembled, the land may be relegated to a
lower-valued use, such as open space.64
A change in the optimal scale of use can introduce a mismatch between
the chunks in which property is supplied (by those who already hold it) and
the chunks in which it is demanded. Here we see an interesting feature of
real property that distinguishes it from many other products and services: it
is supplied in packages and quantities that are determined solely by past
patterns of ownership and use, and by the legal rules governing transfers.65
The old maxim about real estate—“they aren’t making any more of it”66—
translates into a strong and important technological constraint on the ability
of supply decisions to adapt to current demand conditions. All of the
property available for use by future owners exists in the hands of current
owners, each of whom holds a spatial monopoly. Although these spatial
monopolies provide little leverage under most circumstances (close
locational substitutes typically abound), they can produce well-known
difficulties when individually owned parcels represent integral and
complementary pieces of a much more valuable whole.
All of this is well recognized. What is less clear is whether and when
the costs of restricting alienability (that is, keeping present transactors from
slicing entitlements as thinly and idiosyncratically as they desire) are
outweighed by the prospects of easing future reconfiguration difficulties.
The answer depends on a variety of factors, including the degree to which
we can reliably predict the optimal scale of future uses,67 the relative cost of
coercive reconfiguration,68 and the likely shape of the production functions
63

Shmanske & Packey, supra note 21, at 72.
Id.
65
Cf. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 307-08 (2008)
(“Pre-owned resources, and land in particular, bear the legal and physical imprint of the agendas set by prior
owners.”) (footnote omitted).
66
A variant of this aphorism has been attributed to Will Rogers. See PETER WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA: ITS
VALUE, USE, AND CONTROL 6 (1981) (“Will Rogers advised the whole country: ‘Buy land. They ain’t making
any more of the stuff.’”).
67
See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS.99, 120-21 (2010) (arguing that
Michael Heller’s approach implicitly and incorrectly assumes that we can identify a resource’s “ideal use” in
advance, and arrange property rights to achieve it).
68
See infra Part II.C. To the extent that coercive overrides become necessary, the “ease of reconfiguration”
advantages associated with restricting property configurations become moot. Limits on fragmentation may reduce
the total number of pieces to be assembled, and so may improve the prospects for private transactions or at least
reduce the number of owners who must be coerced. But there is a potential nonlinearity here as well: If the costs
of private assemblies become prohibitive once a certain threshold of complementarity and numerosity is reached,
and if it is entirely inefficient to keep property in large enough chunks to stay below that threshold, then blocking
desired fragmentation could be a futile effort that frustrates current would-be transactors without providing
significant benefits to later would-be transactors.
64
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through which particular aggregations generate value. For example, it will
typically be unclear whether future efficient uses will require more
aggregation or more disaggregation. Anticommons theorists focus their
attention exclusively on the dangers of fragmentation, which would suggest
that only reaggregation poses problems.69 But if consolidated holdings
implicate the interests of multiple stakeholders who hold either de facto or
de jure vetoes, disaggregation may also prove difficult. For example,
moves that take property out of common ownership and into individual
ownership may be blocked by holdout dynamics.70
There are many other complications that have not received attention
from legal scholars. For example, imagine that a developer needs a
contiguous 85-acre parcel within an area containing 100 acres. Will her
chances of a private assembly be better if she faces five owners who each
own 20-acre lots, or 100 owners who each own one-acre lots? It is
impossible to be sure without more information,71 but we can say this much:
each owner’s contribution will be critical in the case of 20-acre holdings,
whereas fifteen owners’ contributions will be unnecessary where the pieces
are smaller. Once we consider the possibility that production functions can
vary depending on the size of the pieces in play, it is no longer self-evident
that smaller holdings always perform less well on private aggregation tasks.
C. Dividing and Aggregating
As the discussion above has already suggested, property law is deeply
concerned with questions of entitlement division and aggregation. In an
important sense, property is aggregation, insofar as it derives much of its
value from clumping together, and making durable, sets of rights. At the
same time, property law is often called upon to divide entitlements in
various ways. When market transactions prove unequal to the task of
shifting from one scale of use or form of ownership to another, the
government may turn to coercive reconfiguration, as through eminent

69
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 60, at 1165–69; Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
595, 626-27 (2002).
70
See, e.g., CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF
AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 187 (1980); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 97 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998); see also Fennell, supra note
62(discussing such possibilities).
71
For example, we would need to know the degree to which contiguity is required or whether there are other
constraints on the shape or configuration of the assembled parcels. These questions will determine the degree to
which different parcels are in competition with each other, and the degree to which the problem breaks down into
one in which some smaller subset of parcels (such as those in the core of the configuration) exhibit perfect
complementarity. See Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A
Problem for Market Design, AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proceedings) (forthcoming 2012) (comparing assembly
problems exhibiting perfect complementarity with those that require all the components in one of several possible
clusters, and with those that require one component from each of several clusters).
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domain or partition.72 The doctrines surrounding these operations are, or
should be, sensitive to the ways in which aggregations of entitlements may
produce nonlinear lumps of value.
1. Eminent Domain
Property’s lumpiness arises most saliently in the context of land
assembly. Eminent domain routinely addresses settings where the whole is
(or may be) greater than the sum of its parts. Sometimes this is dramatically
so, as where a planned highway (much like a bridge) becomes close to
useless if segments are missing from it. In other cases, having all the pieces
of a particular contiguous holding will greatly increase the value of the
parcel as a whole, even if it is possible to glean some returns from
something short of the whole. Relying on private transactions to assemble
land is one alternative, and configuration rules may bear on the ease or
difficulty of these transactions. But a core problem of monopoly power,
coupled with private information about reservation prices, can plague many
attempted aggregations.73 Thus, private efforts to reconfigure property—
whether to achieve more efficient lumps or to break down inefficient
lumps—may run aground due to strategic bargaining problems or other
transaction costs.
Coercive overrides solve this problem, but carry costs of their own.
Notably, it is often unclear whether an assembly is efficient, or whether the
property is collectively more valuable in pieces. Private transactions rule
out inefficient assemblies, but bargaining impasse may block efficient
assemblies. Eminent domain and other coercive transfers solve this second
problem, but at the potential cost of allowing some inefficient assemblies to
go forward. Explicitly recognizing lumpiness provides traction on the
rationale for coercion and thereby affords a reasoned basis for constructing
functional limits.74 Significantly, however, the spatial aggregation
facilitated by eminent domain may not be the only aggregation in the
picture: there may also be temporal or community-based aggregations that
will be split up as a result.75 Differences in the respective production
functions of the competing assemblies can also have a large impact on the
need for, and impact of, coercive reconfigurations.76

72

See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 62, at 1018 (discussing “forced reconfiguration”).
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74-75 (1986)
(discussing monopoly problems presented in assembly projects).
74
See Merrill, supra note 73, at 65 (analyzing eminent domain as a means for overcoming impediments to
private bargains under “thin market” conditions); see also infra Part IV.C.
75
See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 4, at 135-42.
76
See supra Part IV.C.
73
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2. Regulatory Takings Doctrine
Sometimes coercive aggregations occur not through condemnation of
land but rather through regulatory action that seeks to achieve some
consistent result across parcels or to otherwise employ existing property
rights in pursuit of a collective goal. Some of the lumpiness-related points
discussed in the context of exclusion reappear in takings doctrine. The
most obvious manifestation is Loretto’s per se rule for permanent physical
encroachments, no matter how small.77 This rule deepens the discontinuity
in legal results at the property’s boundary by treating even trivial physical
incursions as takings for which just compensation must be paid,78 even
when severe financial impacts associated with regulatory changes go
uncompensated.79
Another important line in takings law proceeds from the premise that
losing all of some particular interest (even one that is not terribly valuable)
is a more severe interference than losing part of the value of an interest—
even if the dollar value of the interference is much larger in the latter case
than in the former. This idea appears in Lucas’s per se rule, which holds
that regulations that remove all economically viable use will always
constitute takings except where those regulations reflect background
restrictions on title.80 It also surfaces in the Court’s invocation of “distinct,
investment-backed expectations” in the Penn Central test.81 And the same
“all versus some” distinction features in Tahoe-Sierra’s and Penn Central’s
refusals to allow claimants to “conceptually sever” time slices and air
rights, respectively.82
Initially this distinction might seem to be in tension with a notion of
77

Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
The argument from lumpiness might be taken even further: given complementarities, paying for the
encroachment alone may be undercompensatory. A more protective rule might put the government to a choice
between taking a larger chunk than it might otherwise choose (and compensating for it), or taking nothing. See
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 62, at 1064-65 (observing that an “asset-oriented perspective” would argue
against a “minimalist” approach of taking as little through eminent domain as possible). At the extreme, a takee
from whom the government proposes to take just a small slice might receive a put option that would enable her to
force a sale to the government of the full parcel at its fair market value.
79
See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criticizing the distinction takings law draws
between physical impositions and reductions in value).
80
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
81
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (reiterating the
Penn Central test, including the factor of “distinct, investment-backed expectations.”). The phrase was based on
Frank Michelman’s notion of a “distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.” Frank
I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation”
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
82
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (“’Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”); TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. at 331 (“Petitioners' ‘conceptual severance’ argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn
Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’”). The term
“conceptual severance” was coined by Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667, 1674-79 (1998).
78
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lumpiness, and with my suggestion above that physical encroachments are
problematic precisely because they break open a unified whole. But note
that the “all versus some” distinction is applied in contexts where there is no
permanent physical encroachment, but rather an interference with one or
more ways of deriving value from property. Where a subset of value is
drained away, the interference is arguably more analogous to a stock losing
some increment of fungible value than to breaking open a capsule.83 The
point could be disputed, of course. The “capsule” in question might be a
broad set of options for future property use, so that curtailing the frontier of
possibilities makes the interest into a distinctly lesser thing. If we thought
potential uses were like segments of a bridge that stack together to produce
a unified repository of value that loses its purpose altogether when even one
is removed—a web of value that unravels wholly whenever the government
pulls on a single thread—then this would be the case.
In contrast, current regulatory takings doctrine seems to almost assume
a form of reverse lumpiness in which one does not much notice or mind that
one has lost anything, until one has lost almost the whole thing—or at least
some whole thing. Unlike a bridge or car that stops generating value after
the first major part is removed, property on this account is more like a tank
of gas that generates excellent value right up until the point that it runs out
entirely. Pushing the analogy a little further, compare the effects of
gasoline siphoning on A, whose large vehicle has half its 30-gallon tank
drained away, and on B, who owns three vehicles with 10 gallon tanks, one
of which is drained entirely. A suffers a greater loss in absolute terms (15
gallons rather than 10 gallons) but B loses more in vehicular functionality.
Whether or not property should be viewed in these terms is open to
question. As Frank Michelman has observed, there may be something
psychologically salient, and especially demoralizing, about losing an entire
thing to the government’s act.84 That reaction might be a product of the
binary way that objects tend to be acquired—all at once, at a single moment
in time, rather than through a process of slow accretion.85 If people tend to
think in all-or-nothing lumps as a result of acquisition protocols, then they
might be especially inclined to think in all-or-nothing terms when it comes
83

This observation raises the question of why value losses are not counted as takings, an inquiry that relates
conceptually to the literature on the line between taxes and takings. See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing
Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2010) (emphasizing the law’s differential treatment of governmental acts
that reduce value and those that interfere with exclusion or other core property rights)For a novel discontinuitybased argument for the distinction (albeit one that would require some changes in current takings doctrine), see
Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle and Its Broader
Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 223-60 (2002) (describing and normatively defending the “continuous
burdens principle” under which compensation is required for governmental acts that introduce a sharp
discontinuity between the burdens that different individuals must bear).
84
Michelman, supra note 81, at 1234 (noting this possibility but observing that the empirical truth of this
proposition is “surely debatable”)
85
Adverse possession and prescriptive claims are notable exceptions. There are also a variety of lease-toown and installment purchases arrangements that spread acquisition over time.
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to losing value. The question remains, however, whether this is simply a
psychological artifact that proves misleading in the takings realm, or
whether it tracks onto something meaningful about how people
experience—or produce value on—property.86
Another potential rationale for the “discrete twig”87 approach to takings
law might lie in production cost discontinuities—here the cost of producing
protection from disproportionate burdens. Michelman’s notion of settlement
costs bears on this point.88 If screening for and settling up over thing-loss is
relatively cheap, this may help to explain why the law might introduce a
discontinuity into doctrine at the point of complete loss.
3. Judicial Takings
The Supreme Court’s recent, inconclusive decision in Stop the Beach
Renourishment89 has drawn new attention to the question of judicial
takings—the possibility that a court-initiated change in property law could
amount to a compensable taking. A significant concern for many is that
such a doctrine might hamper courts in carrying out the usual business of
adjudication, and thereby impair the organic development of the common
law.90 In the search for limiting principles, the notion of lumpiness might
well play a role.
Consider again the recurring theme in takings law that losing a discrete
thing is a more severe interference than losing a portion of a thing’s value,
and hence more likely to be considered a taking. Transplanted into the
judicial realm, this principle would seem to offer little insulation against the
threat to common law adjudication. After all, many property disputes
involve precisely who will get some discrete interest, such as an easement, a
chattel, or even an estate in land. But examining lumpiness on the other
side of the transaction provides traction, and a potential limiting principle.
In virtually all regulatory takings committed by political actors, the thing
taken from the owner is not just shifted to someone else, but rather is
combined with interests taken from other owners to form a larger
assemblage of entitlements. Just as eminent domain can explicitly generate
86
For discussion on perceptions of property, and the extent to which those perceptions are manipulable, see,
for example, Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449 (2010).
87
Michelman, supra note 87, at 1233.
88
Michelman, supra note 81, at 1214 (defining “settlement costs”); see also id. at 1234 (describing as
“probably true” the proposition that such “specially painful” deprivations of a discrete thing “can usually be
identified by compensation tribunals with relative ease”).
89
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. __; 130
S. Ct. 2592 (2010). Although the Court was unanimous in finding that no judicial taking occurred in the case at
hand, a four-Justice plurality endorsed the idea of a judicial taking.
90
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 107, 113 (2011); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New
Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247 (2011).
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an assembly surplus by putting together parcels of land, regulatory action
generates surplus through regulatory assemblages, whether a path along a
beach or a conservation goal or a uniform plan for the preservation of
landmarks.
In most adjudicated property disputes, in contrast, the only question
may be “who owns this twig?” Either way the case goes, it will remain a
twig. In rare cases, though, a judicial decision could have the effect of
assembling many property interests together to achieve a larger goal. For
example, a court might change beach access rights and thereby effectively
construct a new easement across the property of many landowners.91 Such
an exercise more closely resembles the acts of eminent domain undertaken
by the political branches, and looks less like the ordinary stuff of resolving
disputes.92 The pursuit of regulatory or spatial lumps might thus be used to
help pour content into an emerging judicial takings doctrine.93
4. Ordinary Adjudication
Despite occasional results like the one in Popov v. Hayashi,94 which
split ownership of a home run baseball, property law usually delivers all-ornothing outcomes.95 Does the lumpy character of these decisions match
some underlying feature of the way utility is thought to map onto property,
or is there something about the process of producing results that creates
pressure toward lumpy outcomes? The questions are empirical ones, but
both suppositions could play a role. Land and other things may be much
more valuable when kept physically and temporally intact, and high
transaction costs might impede reuniting the whole if pieces were dispersed
among litigants. A system that dispenses lumpy outcomes may also be
cheaper to administer. The party with the weaker claim to an asset cannot
gain leverage by winning a fractional share, nor need courts attempt to parse
the relative strength of claims that fall short of the level necessary to tip the
entire case to a win.
The treatment of cotenants’ interests in partition cases offers an
interesting window into the lumpiness of property adjudication precisely
91
See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1965) (making an analogous
distinction “between the role of government as participant and the government as mediator in the process of
competition among economic claims.”).
92
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL L. 421, 424-28 (2010) (describing a
“boundary maintenance” approach to regulatory takings that examines both how much a given regulatory act
resembles eminent domain and how much it resembles an exercise of the police power).
93
The question of whether a judicial takings doctrine should be recognized at all is one I do not take up here.
94
Superior Court of California, Dec. 18, 2002. See also LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139-56
(2011); R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 FORD. L REV 313 (1983) (assessing the
prospects for equitable division in the law of finding and noting its limited use in some joint finder cases).
95
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 113 (7th ed. 2010) (noting the “all or nothing” nature of
the property law of finders).
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because the concurrent interests of the parties preclude an entirely all-ornothing outcome. Although traditionally preferred, partition in kind
(physically dividing the land) is much less common than partition by sale,
which keeps the land intact.96 The widespread use of partition by sale, and
the rationales underlying it, map onto notions of spatial lumpiness. If
cutting up the land into pieces will render it less valuable, courts will often
order a sale instead.97 What, then, could account for the historical
preference for partition in kind? The answer may be found in temporal
lumpiness. For example, an elderly cotenant who has resided on a parcel
her whole life may experience an extraordinarily sharp discontinuity in
utility between being allowed to stay there to the end of her life, and being
ousted even a very short period earlier.98 To return to a metaphor
introduced earlier, partition must break open the capsule of property, either
spatially or temporally; the question is which of the two is less costly.
III. LUMPINESS AND PROPERTY THEORY
If property is lumpy in the ways just suggested, what does that mean for
property theory? In the sections that follow, I will sketch the implications
of lumpiness for two current theoretical debates. Section A addresses the
bundle of sticks metaphor and Section B considers the tension between
exclusion and social obligation.
A. Bundles and Sticks
The idea of property as a “bundle of sticks” or “bundle of rights” has
been associated with the work of the legal realists, and, more recently, the
law and economics movement.99 The metaphor has come under sustained
96

See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 343 (7th ed. 2010)
See, e.g., Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 916 (S.D. 1946) (applying a statute that it read to
permit partition by sale “if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the value of the land when divided into
parcels is substantially less than its value when owned by one person”).
98
This rationale seems to have been in play in Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980), a case in
which the court ordered partition in kind. Id. at 33(observing that “one of the tenants in common has been in
actual and exclusive possession of a portion of the property for a substantial period of time; that the tenant has
made her home on the property; and that she derives her livelihood from the operation of a business on this
portion of the property, as her family before her has for many years”); see also Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.
2d 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004) (holding that economic value alone is not dispositive, and that “[e]vidence of
longstanding ownership, coupled with sentimental or emotional interests in the property, may also be considered
in deciding whether the interests of the party opposing the sale will be prejudiced by the property's sale”).
99
See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property
Symposium, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193 (2011) (providing a concise overview of the history of the phrase “bundle of
rights); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE
L.J. 357, 365-66 (2001) (discussing the role of the bundle of rights model in the thinking of the legal realists and
law and economics scholars): Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers
for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 215, 215 (2011) (noting the history of the “only slightly less popular
metaphor” of a “bundle of sticks”). An influential early proponent of the “bundle of rights” metaphor was John
Commons. See JOHN R. COMMONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 92 (1893); Katherine V.W. Stone, John R.
97

24

Fennell

[12-Jan-12

attack for its alleged implicit suggestion that property lacks a stable core,
and that it comprises nothing more than a loosely assembled and endlessly
disaggregable pile of use rights.100 The question of whether property is,
should be, or must be treated as an indivisible lump has played a prominent
if not always fully articulated role in the ensuing debates.101 Robert
Ellickson captures the possibility that property might be a step good when,
channeling Michael Heller, he analogizes rights in property to playing cards
in a deck—a package of complementary elements that become next to
worthless if even one is missing.102
Is property really a step good constructed of such strongly
complementary elements that removing one will cause a cataclysmic loss of
value? One difficulty lies in figuring out exactly what the sticks in the
bundle represent.103 Sometimes they are described as use rights, with
different twigs representing, say, the right to build a house, to emit smoke,
to grow tall trees, to play pinochle, to turn somersaults on the lawn, and so
on.104 Sometimes the sticks are described as different facets of the
ownership interest, so that twigs represent the right to alienate, to devise, to
destroy, to use, and to exclude,105 or as the Hohfeldian units into which
these incidents of ownership might be subdivided.106 Sometimes they are
taken to mean the interests into which a fee estate might be disaggregated,
such as leaseholds, life estates, and easements.107 They might even be
understood as representing rights against all the other people in the world,
so that the twigs might be property rights enforceable against Paul, property
rights enforceable against Kita, property rights enforceable against Oswald,
and so on until the name of every person on the planet has been listed, save
the owner’s.108 And, of course, all these elements can be combined in
innumerable ways (the right to sell pinochle-playing rights to Alex, the right
Commons and the Origins of Legal Realism; Or, The Other Tragedy of the Commons, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 326, 331-32 (Daniel W. Hamilton and Alfred L. Brophy, eds. 2010).
100
There have been other attacks on the metaphor stemming from different sets of concerns. See, e.g.,
Jeanne Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 239 (1994).
101
The state of play can be inferred from a recent symposium devoted entirely to the bundle of rights
metaphor. Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights? 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH (2011).
102
Ellickson, supra note 99, at 218.
103
For discussion of the many ways the bundle metaphor might be understood, see James E. Penner, The
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). Thomas Merrill flags a related problem in
interpreting the Supreme Court’s use of the metaphor—“how to distinguish between a horizontal stick and a
lateral chop” through every stick—where the latter but not the former is understood to be a compensable taking.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 247, 248 (2011).
104
See Penner, supra note 103, at 734.
105
See Tony Honoré, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161 (1987)
(enumerating eleven incidents of ownership).
106
See Penner, supra note 103, at 724-38 (examining the relationship between Hohfeld and Honoré’s work
and the “bundle of rights” view of property) (citing and discussing WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923)).
107
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 99, at 216-17.
108
See Penner, supra note 103, at 757-59.
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to exclude Josephine from the front lawn on Tuesdays, the right to emit
smoke in the direction of Tess when the wind blows from the southwest,
and so on) to create a very large bundle of very small sticks.109
Viewed at this level of specificity, it seems absurd to suggest that
removing one element would always or even very often render property
valueless. On the contrary, owners transact over these rights (and much
larger ones) all the time without ceasing to be owners. However, a weaker
but more convincing claim can be made about agglomeration effects among
rights that would keep aggregation and disaggregation from being a zerosum game.110 There is also an information story in play: it may be
impossible for a nonowner or governmental entity to ascertain the effects of
removing a given twig of value, based on an analysis of that twig alone.
This fits with the idea that property is designed to group together
complementary elements in ways that are intentionally opaque to outsiders
and that make inquiry into the interrelationship among the pieces of the
owners’ holdings unnecessary.111
But the argument from complementarity proves too much. In a complex
society, complementarities exist both within and between owners’ holdings.
The bundle of rights image of property, with its general inattention to the
power of aggregation, can offer no way to test the strength of within- and
between-property complementarities. But, importantly, neither can a vision
of property that treats it as a lumpy and irreducible whole. Manifestly, it is
not: incursions into owners’ prerogatives are made regularly.112 What is
needed, and what is lacking in existing accounts of property, is a way to
gain analytical traction on the choices that must be made among competing
aggregations.
Another facet of the debate between critics and defenders of the bundle
metaphor goes to the mutability and social contingency of property
packages. Suppose we accept that certain entitlement packages currently
tend to be more valuable for participants in a property system. We would
then want to know whether these property configurations hold greater value
due to some underlying fact of the matter. Indeed, we might go further and
ask whether property has some inherent pre-political or natural unity that,

109
See id. at 758 (observing that “it boggles the mind to suppose that [the bundle] includes actual rights
permitting every-one else to do everything with the property, each of which can be transferred to the proper
person at will”).
110
See Ellickson, supra note 99, at 217-18; Henry E. Smith, Property is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8
ECON. J. WATCH 279, 286 (201l). Disaggregation as well as aggregation can add value. Ellickson provides the
colorful example of “a wholesale lot of rabbits’ feet” as an example of a good that becomes more valuable when
disaggregated—apparently due to the rapidly declining marginal utility of such good luck charms. Ellickson,
supra note 99, at 218.
111
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 5, 17 (2009).
112
See GREGORY ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY, ch. 7,
manuscript at 9 (forthcoming 2012) (describing the right to exclude as “pock-marked . . . with exceptions”).
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although it can be split up by humans, retains a recognizable form.113 Or are
lumps largely of our own making? If the strong complementarity that makes
us draw property lines here and not there is contingent on social, cultural,
and technological factors, rebundling may become necessary as conditions
change. Continuing to recognize property as a bundle makes the enterprise
of rebundling easier to contemplate and accomplish—for better or worse.114
B. Exclusion, Obligation, Aggregation
Positioning itself in opposition to economic or welfarist accounts of
property, a “progressive property” school has recently emerged to argue that
property should be informed by a wider range of human values, including
virtue, social obligation, and democracy.115 Among other things, proponents
of this approach have questioned the dominance given to exclusion in
current understandings of property.116 These arguments have been met with
predictable pushback from scholars who view exclusion as a core defining
feature of property.117 Meanwhile, many law and economics scholars
eschew hard exclusion rights in favor of softer liability rules that facilitate
the movement of resources to higher valuing users. These disagreements, I
suggest, can be reframed as debates over competing indivisibilities.
Consider again the exclusion theorists’ objection to the bundle of sticks
metaphor on the grounds that it is unduly sensitive to the complementarities
embedded in individual property holdings. Their approach takes as a given
113
Carol Rose’s metaphor for property that is protected by a property rule—“the whole meatball”—would
seem to suggest as much. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2178-79 (1997).
She observes that the meatball can be split into pieces, as through liability rules, but she nonetheless treats the
meatball itself as the salient unit of analysis. A different approach would recognize entitlements as a type of stuff
that can be sliced thick or thin; we would not need to conceptually identify it with other pieces that have been
granted to other parties. I thank Henry Smith for raising Rose’s meatball analogy.
114
For some sticks critics, that very ease of rebundling is cause for concern and an independent reason to
oppose the sticks metaphor. Such critics worry that the metaphor gives the government too much leeway to
reconfigure property rights without compensation. See, e.g., Klein & Robinson, supra note 91, at 195 (arguing
that “[c]haracterizing property as a ‘bundle of rights’ would make government intervention, not the violating of
property, but rather the rearranging or redefining of the bundle”). Richard Epstein has argued for the opposite
position, on the grounds that each stick has value and recognizing it as a discrete interest could (in theory) support
compensation if it is taken away. Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as Bulwark Against Statist
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 223,233 (2011); see also Radin, supra note 82, at 1678
(noting that conceptual severance leads to “an easy slippery slope to the radical Epstein position” in which
“[e]very curtailment of any of the liberal indicia of property, every regulation of any portion of an owner’s
‘bundle of sticks,’ is a taking of the whole of that particular portion considered separately”).
115
See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer, & Laura Underkuffler, A
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and
Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974573. For a good
summary and critique of the movement, and the different strands within it, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential Of Progressive Property, unpublished manuscript (Fall 2011 draft).
116
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 115, at 107 (noting the significance of “ a theorist’s position on the right
to exclude”); Rosser, supra note 115, at 41 (“A call for a reconsideration of the centrality of the right to exclude in
property law is perhaps the dominant theme of progressive property scholarship.”)
117
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Means and Ends in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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the blocky chunks of control that property has historically given owners.
Interfering with what seems to be a minor twig, we are warned, could upend
the owner’s plans and projects in ways we cannot foresee. The point
resonates: who are we to decide what rights the owner can and cannot do
without, or to predict the intricate and subtle interweaving of entitlements
that lies inside the owner’s block of control? Yet those same blocks of
control can quietly preclude the assembly of larger-scale sets of rights that
might well be interwoven in much the same way. If we were to begin with
a particular community-owned assembly of rights in place, the same “take a
twig, ruin the whole” argument could cut against conferring the rights in
question on individual owners. The notion of complementarities is a robust
one, but it is double-edged in the property context. Private property can
block as well as embody complementarities.
The fact that discontinuities and complementarities often stand on both
sides of an interaction presents real challenges for property law. Households
may get disproportionate amounts of utility from having unlimited tenure
length (even if they don’t actually stay forever), yet truncating tenure (and
hence breaking up one valuable lump) can be instrumental to forming
valuable spatial lumps, as through eminent domain. Similarly, partition in
kind facilitates lumpiness in one direction (time of tenure) but truncates it in
another (space). Exclusion rights respect the supposed lumpiness of an
owner’s holdings by refusing to allow even small encroachments, but hard
exclusion rights also prevent valuable aggregations from being formed
across a set of properties. If aggregating on one dimension means
splintering along another, we might ask whether lumpiness on one or the
other of these dimensions should get more deference, and why. And here
we see different property theorists coming up with different answers.
The progressive property movement urges greater attention to the value
of long temporal lumps and collective social, cultural, distributive, and
deliberative projects that require the aggregate participation of owners.
Exclusion theorists focus on the parcel or thing itself as a lump, the forcible
breaking open of which violates the integrity of the holding. The chunkiness
of owner-initiated changes to default exclusion rights offers one example.
Everyone agrees that once an owner opens her gate to allow in the general
public, she cannot then turn around and exclude segments of the public
based on protected characteristics.118 But other questions remain about the
extent to which an owner should be able to open her gate in owner-specified
degrees. The lumpiness of broader normative commitments of society is
implicated in these debates. To take the easiest case, if uniform application
of antidiscrimination norms across communities and nations is necessary to
118
See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1283, 1457-58 (1996).
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produce results that tend toward equality, then allowing owners to parcel
out access rights just as they please would interfere with that aggregation.119
No doubt progressive property scholars would resist my attempt to boil
down all of property’s core debates to a question of production functions
and nonlinearities.120 Nonetheless, putting things in those terms offers a
way for proponents of different approaches to understand each other’s
concerns. It may seem a simple matter for an owner to give up part of what
she has in the name of social obligation, but if having “nearly all” is
dramatically less valuable than having “all,” her resistance can be better
understood. Likewise, if a given social obligation is viewed as part of an
aggregation that may be difficult to achieve through uncoordinated action,
the interest in achieving it coercively through a reconceptualization of
property may make sense in a way that resonates with law and economics
scholars.
Nobody now disputes the normative correctness of the law’s choice to
accommodate ownership to plane travel by overriding hard exclusion rights
above a certain height, nor of its commitment to enforcing
antidiscrimination norms against private landowners. Casting other social
projects as of a piece with those famous aggregations may be more
controversial, but at least the controversy will be centered in an analytically
useful place.121
IV. LEARNING FROM LUMPINESS
The issues of lumpiness raised in this essay interact with fundamental
questions about choice and coercion in property arrangements. Viewing
these problems through the lens of lumpiness offers useful analytic
guidance.
A. Empty and Constructed Lumps
I have emphasized throughout that many property doctrines are
descriptively lumpy. It is a separate question whether the legally
constructed discontinuities track underlying indivisibilities in consumption
or production. Doctrines that make property law chunky may create or
119
Analogous points have been raised in the context of applying subsidiarity principles to natural resources.
See Graham Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local
Level, 2 INT'L J. COMMONS 75, 78 (2008) (noting problems, including discrimination, requiring the involvement
of higher levels of government).
120
Nonetheless, it is interesting indeed that Gregory Alexander, one of the primary proponents of the
“progressive” or “social obligation” school of property, has recently invoked Charles Taylor’s notion of
“complementarity”—among aspects of an individual’s life—in discussing a pluralistic, social obligation vision of
property.
See Alexander, supra note 115, at 132-33 (citing Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 170, 178-82 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997).
121
See infra Part IV.C (discussing choices among lumps).
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entrench a lumpiness that would not otherwise be present, or they may
sustain a lumpiness that is no longer empirically backed up by the way
property is produced or consumed. Where this is the case, we should at least
consider the possibility of “unchunking” property law along the dimension
on which it currently displays chunkiness.122
It is easy to appreciate the potential costs of such a move, which may
cash out in confusion, complexity, destabilization of expectations,
administrative toil, and overall hassle. But there are costs on the other side
as well. Lumps are not always benign. Not only may they rule out choices
that some parties might highly value, they can also keep society from even
gathering information about preferences for interstitial goods. Some
doctrinal lumps make societal choices less sensitive to behavioral inputs
than might be optimal, while others, such as those in the takings realm, may
misdirect coercive force. Recognizing the lumpy structure of property law
and examining its underpinnings has value, even if one feels certain that the
status quo is optimal. Unless we are convinced that property law should be
immutable, it is important to understand what features of the status quo
make the existing architecture sensible and which changes in empirical
conditions would render it less sensible.
A central problem is that we often lack information about private
valuations of elements in various property packages, much less good data
on how that value grows or shrinks as a function of the aggregation or
disaggregation of entitlements. Finding ways to let owners and nonowners
supply information that credibly speaks to the question of complementarity
offers one alternative. I have argued elsewhere that the law could be
involved in providing platforms for eliciting just this sort of information.123
Given the degree to which property’s value as a social institution depends
on getting aggregations right, we should be interested in finding
mechanisms that can improve its performance on this dimension.
We may also wonder to what degree the law itself, and its various
decisions to entrench, accommodate, or ignore certain concerns, encourages
people to recognize and value certain lumps as lumps.124 For example, does
the law’s enforcement of discontinuities at the property’s edges entrench a
notion of property as an inviolable thing? If so, does this entrenchment
make property lines more focal for owners than they otherwise would be,
122
Proposals to “continuize” the law have been advanced in a variety of doctrinal areas. See KATZ, supra
note 94, at 145-51. The unchunking I refer to here bears a family resemblance to proposals that attempt to break
down doctrinal notches or cliffs in favor of making law more responsive to an underlying continuous variable,
such as degrees of certainty or culpability.
123
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4(2) J. TORT L., art. 3 (2011) (proposing an option
system that would induce low-valuing holders of certain entitlements to self-identify).
124
See, e.g., Steven R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks, 8 ECON. J. WATCH
265, 268-69 (2011) (critiquing Merrill & Smith’s account of property as “discrete assets” on the grounds that it
“encompasses only valued resources that a given legal system and a given community of economic actors already
recognize”).
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hardening the parcel-as-lump in ways that make larger aggregations more
difficult and costly?125 To take another example, when landlord-tenant law
specifies what society views as the appropriate minimum bundle of quality,
space, and tenure length, it may also influence expectations about what
constitutes a “home” in ways that tend to reinforce the legally mandated
minimum bundle. The possibility that law is not merely responding to but
also shaping the chunks in which property delivers utility presents
interesting challenges when it comes to applying coercion in defense or
pursuit of lumps, or choosing between lumps of value.
B. Compelling Lumps
Lumpiness usually goes unnoticed. We buy tires for our cars in sets of
four, shoes in sets of two, and complete rather than partial houses, all
without ever remarking on the complementarities or indivisibilities
involved. When and why must law get involved?
The literature on the production of lumpy public goods offers a starting
point.126 If we need everyone to contribute a bridge segment or we will not
manage to span the gap, then it becomes necessary to coordinate behavior.
Depending on the number of contributors, the number of necessary
segments, and the associated individual and group payoffs, the collective
action problem may take any number of forms.127 Such collective action
problems are not unique to lumpy goods, although the step nature of the
bridge does change the nature of the strategic interaction.128 The potential
sticking point is that many of the benefits of individual contributions will be
externalized to the rest of the group if the bridge is (within the relevant
group) nonrival and nonexcludable.129 Public provision is not invariably
required in such cases,130 but the collective action problems associated with
public goods provide a familiar rationale for coercion.131
125

See generally Nash & Stern, supra note 86.
See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 1, at 55-61; Taylor & Ward, supra note 5; Hampton, supra note 6.
127
See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 5, at 353-54.
128
See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 10, at 57 (observing that “lumpy goods certainly affect individual strategy”);
Hampton, supra note 6, at 259-72 (examining the strategic interactions associated with step goods and
incremental goods, respectively). Public goods with more linear qualities (such as landscaping that may be added
to a public thoroughfare in any amount) generate somewhat different collective action problems. A linear
production function will often produce a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each party will prefer not to contribute,
regardless of what everyone else does. An exception to this rule applies if each person’s contribution generates
marginal returns that are so large that the person herself is made better off even if nobody else contributes. See
Oliver et al., supra note 11, at 533–34 (explaining that, depending on the slope, a linear production function will
induce every player to “contribute either everything possible or nothing”); Fennell, supra note 11, at 956-58
(discussing this point and providing examples).
129
In other words, the bridge has the characteristics of a local public good. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD
SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 32-33 (2d ed. 1996).
130
See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
131
Coercion might be applied even where the good is not publicly provided; those who enjoy the benefits of
a particular good might simply be required to reimburse the provider. See generally Ariel Porat, Private
Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009).
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Suppose instead that we have a private party who is ready to construct a
toll bridge, and who needs only to buy segments from the various
individuals holding them. Here, too, we may face a problem that requires
compulsion. If all the bridge segments are necessary, unique, and
unavailable other than from the specific individuals who now hold them,
there may be a severe holdout problem. If, instead, there are n segmentholders and n-1 necessary segments, the problem is eased considerably.
Indeed, each owner might hurry to avoid being the one whose segment is
left out of the assembly, rather than striving to be the last holdout,
especially if the bridge segments hold little intrinsic value for their owners.
Thus, compulsion may become unnecessary, even when goods are lumpy, if
there is some degree of competition among input-providers or if the inputs
are not strictly complementary.132 This point has obvious applications to
the exercise of eminent domain.
Property lumps might also be compelled by the government because of
its own production efficiencies or to safeguard consumption utility where
individuals will have difficulty doing so for themselves. Consider first
production efficiencies. If property came in just four standard flavors
because of the high start-up costs to the government of inventing and
specifying new property forms, customization post-production would not be
a problem. It would be no different than a consumer of a Model T painting
her car yellow after she buys it. But if there are ongoing costs that the
government bears as a continuing producer of property law—and these
cannot be easily left to fall on the customizer133—then coercion in the name
of cost savings might seem justified. Yet we would need to know more.
Where private decisions impose public costs, a prohibition is only one
possibility, and often not the most efficient one.
We might wonder, for example, whether Pigouvian taxes for property
customization would be an alternative, if we thought that customizations
made the property system marginally more difficult for the government to
operate in ways that the customizer did not internalize.134 Pigouvian taxes
might work well if customizations merely added some degree of
incremental strain to a system, as by marginally increasing the workload
associated with recording and tracking interests in land.135 But taxes are not
132

For exploration of some of these issues, see Kominers & Weyl, supra note 71.
The analog in the private context might be a car manufacturer who voids the warranty of any consumer
who modifies the vehicle, on the ground that this raises the costs of keeping the vehicle in running order.
134
Pigouvian taxes (and subsidies) seek to align private payoffs with social ones by internalizing
externalities. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932); see also Maureen L.
Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 680 (1992) (defining
Pigouvian taxes).
135
In fact, the U.S. system of land recordation largely privatizes the costs of tracking interests in land, as
through the work of title insurance companies. The fact that much of the public good of keeping titles straight is
privately produced does not alter the analysis, though it does affect the distributive impact of any externalities that
customizations produce.
133
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likely to be a suitable response if each new tweak will require a large,
discontinuous input (a new full-time worker, say) which will then leave a
standing supply of excess capacity in treating that particular variation. If the
problem is not with maintaining new property forms as such, but with
getting lots of people to agree on the same new forms, the law might take
the lead in offering platforms for coordinating their launch.136
Similar problems of coordination may exist on the consumption utility
side of the equation. Suppose we accept an extreme account of
informational externalities in which an isolated act of customization by a
single owner can wreak havoc on an entire property system, yet a new
property form that is adopted by a significant segment of the population can
be accommodated.137 Or to generalize the point, suppose that part of what
gives certain packages of property value (for both owners and non-owners)
is the fact that many other people are consuming the same packages. If these
conditions hold, there may be a second-order lumpy good in the picture, in
addition to the lumpy property package itself: the public good of having a
network of consumption patterns that exhibit certain kinds of uniformity.
The question then becomes whether and why compulsion might be
necessary to achieve this public good.
Setting a property menu might on one account be a pure coordination
game, akin to deciding on which side of the road to drive; nobody has any
independent preference on the matter but only wishes to select the same
choice as everyone else.138 In such cases, the law can perform an important
coordination function by making a particular choice focal; enforcement is
generally unnecessary, because it is in everyone’s interest to comply.139 A
somewhat different story is presented if people have different preferences
about what to consume, notwithstanding their overriding preference to
consume the same thing.140 Here, settling on a single package (or limited set
of packages) will require not just coordination, but also substantive
concessions by at least some players. In the property context, the law’s
insistence on a limited menu might operate like an in-kind tax system that
136

A small but illustrative analogue can be found in Department of Motor Vehicles offices that let customers
conditionally commit to purchase a new license plate design—one that will be produced only if enough others
commit to that same design. The author participated in a successful scheme of this sort when Maryland introduced
an “Animal Friendly” license plate in the 1990’s. The DMV collected checks from those willing to purchase the
new plate, promising either to return the check uncashed (if insufficient amounts were collected to support the
new design) or to deliver the new plate itself.
137
This is a hyperbolized version of the account adopted by Merrill and Smith. See Merrill & Smith, supra
note 51, at 47 (“The one out of one hundred who adopts a nonstandard form for property rights can increase the
costs of processing the rights of ninety-nine others.”); id. at 40 (observing that the numerus clausus principle does
allow new property forms to be legislatively created, and thus “permits some positive level of diversification in
the recognized forms of property”).
138
See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1667 (2000).
139
Id. at 1667-68.
140
The game theoretic paradigm for this situation is “The Battle of the Sexes,” in which a couple has an
overriding desire to spend an evening out together, but each member of the couple has a different preferred form
of entertainment. See, e.g., id. at 1672-73 & n.56.

12-Jan-12]

LUMPY PROPERTY

33

compels each person to contribute their “frustration costs”141 to the larger
good of uniformity.
A further inquiry is whether this uniformity is worth the cost of these
compelled inputs—and, even if so, whether we could achieve it at a lower
frustration price by recalibrating the menu to include different, or more,
entries. These questions bring us back to the problems of demand revelation
that plague the provision of pubic goods. The Tiebout hypothesis famously
offers a non-market mechanism for eliciting information about public goods
and services—jurisdictional variation.142 Tiebout’s insight may have
interesting implications here, to the extent that some of the benefits of
uniformity can be achieved at a relatively small scale. For example, if social
or political benefits were thought to flow from everyone in a given
neighborhood or private community holding the same tenure form, local
variation capable of inducing localized sorting could achieve small-scale
uniformity without requiring a fixed tenure menu at the state level.143
C. Choosing Lumps
The analysis to this point has already emphasized that property law must
often choose between competing assemblages; I offer here a few brief
thoughts on how the task might be approached. Most fundamentally,
choosing among competing chunks requires knowing which sets of
entitlements stack together in a highly complementary way and which do
not. In other words, it requires knowing something about the relevant
production functions. Sometimes the degree of complementarity simply
informs (or explains) how a single owner of the relevant inputs will chose
between possible ways of aggregating those inputs. If bridges are being
made by a governmental entity that has only a certain number of linear feet
of bridge material, we will understand why it will choose to allocate those
linear feet to the production of complete rather than partial bridges (or will
have cause to complain if it fails to do so).
If different parties own the necessary inputs, however, they must be
convinced (or coerced) to contribute them to valuable aggregations. Where
strict complementarity is present, the strategic holdout problem may be so
severe as to make some form of coercion unavoidable. The use of coercion
to create a valuable assembly, however, must always grapple with
141

See Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 35-38.
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416 (1956).
This example brackets many important normative and empirical questions—including the possibility that
sorting along tenure lines could impede other valuable aggregations, such as the production of desirable housing
patterns across income lines. The idea that other aspects of property law might be varied locally to induce
Tieboutian sorting was advanced in Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883 (2007).
142
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uncertainty about the private valuations of the separate inputs—that is, with
the possibility that the assembly does not generate surplus after all. A
variety of mechanisms have been discussed in the literature for eliciting
better valuation information from owners, and I will not revisit the
arguments for and against those approaches here. One component of the
valuation story deserves independent attention, however: private valuations
may exceed market values as a result of other, identifiable aggregations that
are already in the picture.
Consider a land assembly that would break up a neighborhood, or that
would interrupt a lengthy period of possession for one or more occupants.
If most people value possession of a home in a fairly linear way, enjoying a
stream of benefits in each year that is untouched by whether the number of
years is few or many, then ending possession abruptly will not do
disproportionate harm. Likewise, if the social benefits in a neighborhood
are accrued block by block in a modular manner that does not depend on the
existence of neighboring blocks, then carving away part of the
neighborhood (as long as blocks are left intact) will do little harm. If,
however, the production functions take different forms, the problem
becomes a complicated one in which the value added by a coercive spatial
aggregation must be compared with the surplus that will be lost by
coercively breaking up other aggregations.144 Even small changes in
assumptions about complementarity can make large differences. For
example, if we soften the assumption of strict complementarity for the
spatial aggregation—suppose the project will deliver most of its value if
80% of the available pieces are supplied—then the nature of the collective
action problem changes dramatically and, potentially, the need for coercion.
Although normative judgments are an unavoidable part of making
choices among lumps, empirical judgments about valuations are central to
the inquiry as well. Finding mechanisms for collecting information about
the likely shape of the production functions at issue should be an important
focus for empirical work.145 We must also confront the possibility that the
law itself may influence how various aggregations are valued, and the
related potential that legal changes could reshape those valuations.146
144
For exploration of some of the issues associated with community aggregations and eminent domain, see
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 4.
145
For example, Stephanie Stern has recently noted the relative dearth of psychological evidence indicating
that people who are displaced from their homes suffer a dire and lasting welfare loss—contrary to the strong
assumptions that have been employed by many legal scholars and social commentators. Stephanie M. Stern,
Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109-19 (2009).
146
Jonathan Nash and Stephanie Stern have empirically investigated the degree to which the framing of
ownership as bundles or as “discrete assets” influences attitudes toward entitlements, and have suggested that the
law might consciously craft property conceptualizations to modulate the strength of ownership claims. Nash &
Stern, supra note 86. Cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1102 (1995) (positing that endowment effects might be weaker in
a liability rule regime); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51
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Conclusion
Legal theory has largely neglected the role of lumpy or discontinuous
production functions. This omission is particularly striking in the field of
property, given the institution’s doctrinal and conceptual focus on things as
indivisible repositories of value. This essay has sketched how lumpiness
matters for property law, and has considered some of the doctrinal and
theoretical implications of explicitly recognizing this aspect of property’s
architecture. It has also raised questions about the mutability and
desirability of lumpy thinking in property law and theory.
A particular concern is whether some aspects of property’s lumpiness
are historical artifacts that no longer correspond to what is most valuable
about the institution for those who use it. Leaving lumps alone is not
costless, especially where the chunks that make up individual property
holdings conflict with other aggregations that society may wish to
undertake at a broader scale. Indeed, some of property’s most important
conflicts can be usefully most framed as lump versus lump. Explicitly
framing things in this way makes clear that the question is not so much
whether property will be lumpy but rather how it will be lumpy.
I must leave to future work a fuller explication of these points, as well
as a wider look at the significance of lumpiness for law across other
doctrinal areas. I hope, however, that the chunk of analysis that I have taken
on here forms for readers a useful lump.
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VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1572-74 (1998) (presenting experimental evidence on the relevance of the legal remedy to
the endowment effect).
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